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Abstract
In this article, we analyze the socioeconomic effects of energy sustainability chal-
lenges raised by oil depletion and climate change at the European and global levels.
We assess macroeconomic impacts at different period markers from 2010 to 2100
and under different visions of the future of globalization. Fragmented capital markets
affect the pace and direction of change and induce additional economic losses in the
long term. Regionalized good markets have a positive effect in the long term because
less intense international trade moderates the effects of fossil fuel constraints. A
sustainable energy future will require implementing policies and measures that are
able to (a) provide correct incentives for long-term investments by resorting to
other signals than current market prices, (b) incorporate sectoral measures that
act complementarily to pricing scheme measures for sectors confronted with
biased agents’ behaviors or strong inertias, and (c) foster globalization patterns
that are consistent with energy sustainability objectives. The challenge consists in
articulating the objectives and the instruments of these different policy and measures
triggering the transition toward a sustainable future.
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The emergence of global environmental issues on the political agenda goes
back to the Stockholm Conference in 1972 in an attempt to provide a political
answer to the alarm by the Club of Rome about the “Limits to Growth” in a
context of a ﬁnite ecosystem (Meadows, Meadows, Randers, & Behrens, 1972).
Against this background, the political interest was focused essentially on issues
raised by the exhaustion of nonrenewable resources, especially fossil energies,
in line with the emergence of geopolitical tensions about oil, as illustrated by
Richard Nixon’s State of the Union address in 1970. Despite debates about the
Malthusian nature of the approach supporting the analysis of the Club of
Rome, the Stockholm Conference recognized the legitimacy of concerns
about the interface between growth, environment, and resources. The concept
of ecodevelopment introduced in 1972 by Maurice Strong to stress the need to
adopt development patterns respecting natural ecosystems was an attempt to
go one step further. Although initially linked predominantly to local problems,
this notion was rapidly extended to global challenges (Sachs, 1980). The inter-
est in the trade-oﬀs between economic, social, and environmental dimensions
across generations evolved in the late 1980s with both the emergence of climate
change on the political agenda and the concept of sustainable development
deﬁned in the 1987 Brundtland Report “Our Common Future” (World
Commission on Environment and Development, 1987). Sustainable develop-
ment has become a key concept in international governance since the Earth
Summit of Rio de Janeiro (1992). It is evidently not accidental that this inter-
est in sustainability issues reappeared at the same time with renewed con-
cerns about geopolitical conﬂicts for the access to cheap oil and gas
(Schlessinger, 1989).
However, 20 years after the Earth Summit, the recent Rio+20 conference
has conﬁrmed the diﬃculty to lay out a coherent roadmap forward for address-
ing global challenges in the framework of sustainable development (Cle´menc¸on,
2012b). In particular, two major division lines drive the debate about environ-
mental sustainability issues. On one hand, diﬀerent approaches have been pro-
posed to formalize more explicitly the concept of sustainability. This has resulted
in the emergence of two polar visions, weak versus strong forms of sustainabil-
ity. The former assumes substitutability of human-made and natural capital,
whereas the latter considers that a minimum level of natural capital must be
preserved, acknowledging the speciﬁcities of natural capital (Pearce & Atkinson,
1993). On the other hand, the opposition between promarket liberals and anti-
market social greens about the compatibility between sustainability, free mar-
kets, and trade liberalization has remained a major source of controversies
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(Clapp & Dauvergne, 2005; Harris & Wise, 2001). In particular, the Rio process
since 1992 has failed to achieve a comprehensive way between free market, trade
liberalization, and governmental regulation (Cle´menc¸on, 2012a). This failure
emphasizes the necessity to explore more in depth the link between sustainability
and globalization processes.
This article considers energy as a nodal point of the relations between sus-
tainability and globalization processes. We focus on global environmental con-
straints related to the energy sector and, more speciﬁcally, on the twofold
sustainability challenge caused by oil depletion and climate change. The socio-
economic eﬀects of these limitations are analyzed both at the global and
European levels, in relation to the energy security concerns of a major oil-
importing region and the transition from a carbon-intensive to a low-carbon
economy. Beyond the agreed-upon role of green measures to foster competitive-
ness of the European economy in the short term,1 we analyze the long-term
challenges posed to Europe by oil dependency and climate change in the context
of socioeconomic and political globalization (Brown, 2008).2
The interplay between economic trajectories, globalization processes, and
environmental issues has been investigated in the literature following
Copeland and Taylor (1994, 1995), who consider global environmental con-
straints (“transboundary pollution” in their words) and focus on the role of
trade costs on pollution. Their approach provides useful insights on the envir-
onmental consequences of economic growth and international trade (Copeland
& Taylor, 2004) but suﬀers from important limitations to policy analysis of
sustainability and trade. First, their two-sector formulation diﬀerentiates pollu-
tive and nonpollutive goods but fails to capture the complexity of trade inter-
actions between varieties of goods. Second, their static approach fails to capture
the dynamic processes that are central for the analysis of sustainable trajectories.
Finally, their approach pertains to a weak vision of sustainability, where the
environment is considered as a form of a natural capital, partially substitutable
with human-made capital.
In this article, we adopt the computable general equilibrium (CGE) model
IMACLIM-R, which provides a multisectoral, dynamic modeling approach for
thinking the link between growth, globalization, and energy constraints given
the limited availability of fossil resources and carbon mitigation policies. This
framework captures four crucial determinants of the interplay between the
energy sector, sustainability objectives, and globalization processes: (a) nonmar-
ginal deviations with respect to current socioeconomic trends produce room for
deep technical change over the course of the century3; (b) beyond technological
improvements, the integration of lifestyles, consumption patterns, and prefer-
ences in driving the material content of economic activity is captured (Mitchell,
2012); (c) limitations in the ﬂexibility of technicoeconomic adjustments during
transition processes aﬀect the adaptability of the economy to sustainability con-
straints because of market imperfections, technical inertias, and imperfect
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expectations; and (d) the competitiveness of opened economies on international
markets impacts the balance of goods and capital.
The following section sketches the core mechanisms of the interplay between
the energy sector, the sustainability of socioeconomic patterns, and globalization
processes. The next section presents the modeling approach by detailing both the
macroeconomic structure and the representation of energy dimensions under
investigation, namely, oil sector and climate policies. Then, the long-term pro-
ﬁles of oil markets and their macroeconomic eﬀects in the absence of carbon
constraint for diﬀerent visions of globalization processes are presented. The
subsequent section extends the results to the case where a climate policy is
implemented. The last section provides policy insights and concluding remarks.
The Energy Sector, Sustainable Patterns of Development,
and Globalization Processes
Oil Resource Scarcity and Climate Policies, Two Closely Interrelated
Sustainability Challenges
On one hand, heavy reliance on international markets to satisfy oil-dependent
development patterns and constraints on supply imposed by investment deci-
sions and reserve availability are expected to create tensions on the oil market.
This context raises main political concerns as illustrated by the debates on Peak
Oil (see Al-Husseini, 2006, for a review) and energy security in oil-importing
countries. It has been revived by the strong volatility of oil markets and the
spectacular spikes of prices in recent years (up to $140 per barrel in 2008). These
issues are even more crucial when adopting the long-term perspective considered
in this study because of supply-side constraints (depletion of conventional oil
reserves, uncertainties on the deployment of nonconventional resources, and
concentration of production in politically sensitive regions) and the speciﬁcities
of oil demand (low price elasticity, captive uses in transport, and access to oil-
based mobility in emerging economies).
On the other hand, despite the implementation of policies designed to slow
down the rate of carbon emissions in some regions (e.g., EU Emissions Trading
Scheme [EU-ETS] for the industry sector in Europe), CO2 emissions have con-
tinued to grow in the past decade even more rapidly than predicted (Peters et al.,
2012; Raupach et al., 2007). This context is the result of both the diﬃculty to
decouple growth and carbon emissions in developed regions, where development
styles cannot be changed overnight, and the rapid carbon-intensive growth pat-
terns of emerging countries. This situation raises strong doubts on the sustain-
ability of business-as-usual development patterns in terms of long-term climate
eﬀects (N. Stern, 2006). It also highlights the necessity to implement ambitious
measures to trigger a strong bifurcation away from carbon-intensive develop-
ment paths (International Panel on Climate Change [IPCC], 2007).4 Despite this
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scientiﬁc consensus, the implementation of ambitious global carbon emission
reduction targets remains highly uncertain as shown by the diﬃculties to
reach a global climate agreement under the United Framework Convention
on Climate Change (UNFCCC), and in particular since the failure of the
Copenhagen Conference in 2009. This is essentially due to the concerns about
(a) signiﬁcant welfare and economic losses consecutive to carbon restrictions and
(b) the interplay of climate measures with other sensitive political issues such as
the ﬁnancial crisis, poverty alleviation, job creation, energy and food security, or
health and local environmental protection (e.g., see the dilemma of the climate
development Gordian knot discussed in Hourcade, Shukla, & Mathy, 2008).
Thus, one key challenge of the post-2012 climate policies is to examine the
facets of the call for a paradigm shift of climate negotiations included in the
Cancun agreement,5 which is the precondition to overcome this dilemma (Skea,
Hourcade, & Lechtenbo¨hmer, 2013).
Far from being independent, the two previously deﬁned sustainability chal-
lenges posed by the energy sector—oil depletion and climate change—are closely
intertwined dimensions. Indeed, they both focus on the decline of fossil energy
as the major source of anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions. They are also
a key determinant of international trade ﬂows and a crucial component of
the energy mix. In particular, the moderation of fossil fuel consumption caused
by an ambitious climate policy has the potential cobeneﬁt of lowering dependency
on importations in energy-importing countries. This cobeneﬁt of climate policies
has remained a major political obstacle for the adoption of ambitious post-2012
climate targets in oil-importing countries, even during periods of low oil prices.6
The crucial methodological challenge is then to investigate the synergies and
trade-oﬀs between the tensions and future shocks on oil markets and the socio-
economic eﬀects of ambitious climate policies. The climate policy indirectly
delays the exploitation of oil and slows down its depletion rate while giving
an early signal of the long-term scarcity of this exhaustible resource. In addition,
it aﬀects the geopolitics of oil markets by calling for a strategic response of
major oil producers to this threat on their exportation revenues. This interplay
plays a crucial role in climate negotiations as demonstrated by the Organization
of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) countries’ claim for monetary
compensations in exchange for their compliance to climate agreements in Article
4.8 of the UNFCCC and Article 3.14 of the Kyoto Protocol (see Waisman,
Rozenberg, & Hourcade, 2012, for an analysis of the speciﬁc issues raised by
such compensation mechanisms). Conversely, constraints on oil availability
make long-term objectives of a climate policy easier by limiting the amount of
oil-related carbon emissions. However, a side eﬀect may be higher transition cost
toward a low-carbon economy. It may force a larger decrease of oil with respect
to coal and gas even though this source of energy is the most diﬃcult to abstract
from in the short and medium term because of its captive uses (in particular in
the transport sector).
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Globalization Processes and the Energy Sector
Globalization is a decisive driver of the future of energy markets in the transition
toward low-oil and low-carbon development patterns. Indeed, at a global level,
(a) oil markets are internationally integrated so that oil prices and quantities
depend on the interaction between supply and demand at the world level (e.g.,
this is diﬀerent for gas markets, which remain divided into independent regional
markets because of distribution constraints), (b) climate impacts result from
global emissions so that low-carbon trajectories must be set at the world level,
and (c) their implementation involves rethinking trade interactions among
regions that would be aﬀected in a diﬀerent way by a carbon constraint.
These changes in trade ﬂows therefore raise issues of the compatibility between
climate policies with the rules of World Trade Organization [WTO] (James,
2009; World Trade Organization [WTO] & United Nations Environmental
Programme [UNEP], 2009). We therefore analyze the interplay between these
energy concerns and the transition toward sustainable futures under diﬀerent
visions of the globalization process. These are captured by alternative assump-
tions on trade and capital ﬂows, between the pursuit of current globalization
trends characterized by market integration and a reversal of international ﬂows
toward a correction of capital imbalances at a regional level.
The link between international trade, capital mobility, and environmental
quality has been conventionally examined with theoretical approaches focusing
on two major eﬀects: the environmental Kuznets curve, which extrapolates the
inverted U-shaped Kuznets curve to environmental issues, and the pollution
haven hypothesis (see Cole, 2004, for an analysis of the link between these
approaches). The environmental Kuznets curve states that fast growth favored
by freer trade worsens environment problems in the ﬁrst stages of the develop-
ment process, whereas at high wealth levels it has a positive eﬀect as the demand
for environmental quality increases and the aﬀordability of costly investments in
environmental protection improves. However, there is little evidence that the
relationship holds true for natural resource use or for greenhouse gas emissions
(see Dinda, 2004, for a survey and D. Stern, 2004, for a historical review of this
approach). On the other hand, the pollution haven hypothesis analyzes the eﬀect
of asymmetric environmental policies on trade ﬂows (Taylor, 2004). It points out
the risk that trade liberalization shifts environmentally intensive industries to
countries with relatively weak environmental policy. This is the so-called race to
the bottom eﬀect as countries weaken their environmental policy in response
to freer trade to shelter their industry from international competition. These
approaches nonetheless neglect the distribution of natural and technical endow-
ments among regions (natural resource, capital, technology, infrastructure, or
distance to major markets) as driving the direction of trade and its intensity.
We adopt in this article a complementary approach of globalization patterns
by endogenizing technical and consumption choices and making explicit their
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interplay with development pathways and their environmental consequences.
This is done through a CGE approach applied to the world economy that rep-
resents endogenous technical change as an outcome of investment decisions
under imperfect foresights and cumulative processes such as learning by
doing. This explicit representation allows describing the interaction between
the determinants of oil markets (oil supply and demand), carbon emissions
from energy uses, and their macroeconomic impact given the global dynamics
of the world economy, including trade ﬂows and capital markets.
An Energy-Economy Model to Investigate Sustainability
Transitions in a Globalized Economy
Long-term transition toward sustainable future analysis raises the question of the
representation of important departures from current trends in consumption pat-
terns, technological choices, and lifestyles, triggered by long-term complex inter-
actions betweenmultiple factors. This concern has given rise to a speciﬁc corpus of
scientiﬁc studies developing diﬀerent focus on multilevel development of technol-
ogies andmanagement of the transition (see, e.g.,Geels, 2002;Kemp, Loorbach,&
Rotmans, 2007; Rotmans & Loorbach, 2009). Diﬀerent sector-based applications
are proposed in this special issue: Brunelle, Dumas, and Souty (2014) for agricul-
ture;Ko¨hler,Walz, andMarscheider-Weidemann (2014) for eco-innovation in the
case of biofuels; and Ko¨hler (2014) for international transport.
The speciﬁc role of the energy sector in long-term transitions has been
addressed by a large set of modeling experiments that have been developed
after the ﬁrst oil shock and the emergence of climate change in the political
agenda. Econometric approaches based on the extrapolation of past trends are
widely used for the analysis of the interactions between energy and the economy
(see, e.g., Hamilton, 2008, for the relationship between oil and the macroecon-
omy). However, these econometric approaches are unable to consider large-scale
structural and technical changes such as the ones to be considered in long-term
socioeconomic interactions. Alternatively, integrated assessment models (IAMs;
Weyant et al., 1996) have the twofold advantage of (a) providing an endogenous
representation of technical change in relation to its structural, behavioral, and
technological dimensions and (b) capturing path dependencies through an explicit
accounting of cumulative eﬀects of past investment choices on current economic
settings. Those models are in particular widely used in energy and climate change
communities for their ability to represent large departures from past and current
socioeconomic trends as a result of carbon mitigation policies.
The Modeling Framework IMACLIM-R
In this article, we adopt the IAM energy-economy model IMACLIM-R, which
adopts a dynamic, multiregion, and multisector representation of the world
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economy7 on the backbone of a CGE framework (see Waisman, Guivarch,
Grazi, & Hourcade, 2012, for an extensive description). It provides a consistent
vision of economic and energy trajectories in yearly steps from 2010 to 2100
through the recursive succession of a top-down annual static equilibrium pro-
viding a snapshot of the economy at each yearly time step and through bottom-
up dynamic modules informing on the evolution of technical parameters
between two equilibria (Figure 1).
The static equilibrium represents short-run macroeconomic interactions at
each date t under technology and capacity constraints. It is calculated assuming
Leontief production functions with ﬁxed intermediate consumption, labor
inputs, and mark-up in nonenergy sectors. Households maximize their utility
through a trade-oﬀ between consumption goods, mobility services, and residen-
tial energy uses considering ﬁxed end-use equipment. The equilibrium is given by
market clearing conditions on all markets (including energy), which provides a
snapshot of the economy at date t in terms of relative prices, wages, employ-
ment, production levels, and trade ﬂows.
The dynamic modules are reduced forms of bottom-up models, which
describe the evolution of structural and technical parameters between t and
t+ 1 in response to past and current economic signals. At each year, the regio-
nal capital accumulation is given by ﬁrms’ investment, households’ savings
Figure 1. The recursive and modular structure of the IMACLIM-R model.
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(controlled by exogenous saving rates like in Solow, 1956), and international
capital ﬂows. On that basis, the across-sector distribution of investments is gov-
erned by expectations on sector proﬁtability and technical conditions as
described in sector-speciﬁc reduced forms of technology-rich models (see details
in the supplementary material of Waisman, Guivarch, 2012). These modules
represent the evolution of technical coeﬃcients resulting from agents’ microeco-
nomic decisions on technological choices, given the limits imposed by the innov-
ation possibility frontier (Ahmad, 1966). The new investment choices and
technical coeﬃcients are then sent back to the static module in the form of
updated production capacities and input–output coeﬃcients to calculate the
t+ 1 equilibrium.
This modeling framework diﬀers from conventional IAMs in several fea-
tures that make it relevant to investigate important speciﬁcities of sustainabil-
ity transitions. First, the consistency of the iteration between the static
equilibrium and dynamic modules relies on hybrid matrices, which ensure an
explicit representation of the material and technical content of production
processes through a description of the economy in consistent money values
and physical quantities (Sands, Miller, & Kim, 2005). Second, the equilibrium
does not necessarily correspond to economic optimality because inertias on
capital stocks limit the pace of technical change, the stickiness of the labor
market aﬀects labor adjustments, and market power leads to departures from
marginal cost pricing. This means that production factors (production capacity
and labor force) are not fully used, which ensures the possibility to represent
idle capacities and unemployment. Third, contrary to the conventional
assumption of intertemporally optimizing models, agents have imperfect know-
ledge about the future and may take investment decisions according to biased
expectations. This allows representing bifurcations, lock-ins, and potential
cobeneﬁts in the course of sustainable trajectories. Fourth, the hybrid structure
of the model allows making explicit the technical assumptions behind the
trajectories, which can be informed by sector-based information and expert
views about, for example, asymptotes on ultimate technical potentials,
learning-by-doing mechanisms, saturation in eﬃciency progress, the impact
of incentive systems, and the role of market or institutional imperfections.
Given the uncertainty on the long-term dynamics of these dimensions, their
explicit representation allows considering variants of scenarios suited to cap-
ture alternative views on these controversial parameters. Finally, contrary to
the common approach of a unique composite good, the detailed multisectoral
structure distinguishes productive sectors (agriculture, heavy industries, man-
ufacturing, and services) according to their economic characteristics and their
exposure to international trade. This allows a more precise description of the
determinants of international trade.
The next sections detail the modeling options adopted for the three
core dimensions of the present study, namely, oil markets (Modeling the
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Long-Term Dynamics of Oil Markets), climate policy (Climate Constraints
and Carbon Price), and international trade (Speciﬁcations for International
Trade).
Modeling the Long-Term Dynamics of Oil Markets
Market mechanisms in the oil sector are driven by the utilization rate of pro-
duction capacities, given by the ratio of total demand to production capacities:
the higher the utilization rate, the higher the scarcity rent and the proﬁt margin
for oil producers (Kaufmann, Dees, Karadeloglou, & Sanchez, 2004). We pic-
ture oil price formation through an explicit description of its geopolitical, tech-
nical, and economic determinants on both the supply and the demand. We
represent (a) the heterogeneity of oil reserves as a function of their cost of
exploitation and conventional versus nonconventional nature; (b) the limitations
on the short-term adaptability of oil supply due to the geological nature of
reserves; (c) the market power of Middle East producers until the depletion
aﬀects the deployment of their production capacities; (d) technical change aﬀect-
ing the demand for liquid fuels in industry, residential, transport, and power
sectors; and (e) the potentials and obstacles to the diﬀusion of biofuels and coal-
to-liquid fuels as oil substitutes. These features of the representation of oil
supply/demand dynamics are more extensively described by Waisman,
Rozenberg, Sassi, and Hourcade (2012).
In this article, we adopt median assumptions on the crucial determinants of
oil price dynamics, namely, the amount of reserves (Table 1), geological inertias
(assumed to be the same for conventional and nonconventional reserves), and
the short-term price targeted by Middle East producers (assumed to be stabilized
around its 2010 level).
Table 1. Assumptions About Oil Resources (Trillion Barrels).
Resources extracted
before 2001
Recoverable resources beyond 2001a
Conventional oil
Nonconventional oil (heavy oil and
tar sands)
Middle
East
Rest of
the world Canada Latin America
Rest of
the world
0.895 0.78 1.17 0.220 0.38 0.4
aRecoverable resources are 2P reserves (Proven + Probable) remaining in the soil, which has been identi-
fied as the relevant indicator to investigate global oil peak (Bentley, Mannan, & Wheeler, 2007).
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Climate Constraints and Carbon Price
Carbon emissions arising from the production and use of fossil energies—coal,
oil, and gas—are counted via coeﬃcients capturing their respective carbon con-
tent.8 When climate policies are applied, a constraint on the proﬁle of carbon
emissions is imposed as a function of the chosen climate stabilization target. For
the comparability of results, this article considers a unique climate objective.
It consists of limiting the temperature increase with respect to preindustrial
levels to +2.5 C, which is commonly believed to be more realistic than the
+2 C normative objective.9 Following Barker et al. (2007, Table TS2), this
objective is translated into a carbon emission proﬁle characterized by a peak
of world CO2 emissions between 2010 and 2030 and a stabilization in 2050 with
respect to 2000 levels (Figure 2). Note that this approach of climate constraint in
the form of an imposed carbon emission trajectory that must not be exceeded
whatever the costs corresponds to the critical sustainability concept. This
approach acknowledges that diﬀerent forms of natural capital are not merely
an economic input but often a general prerequisite of human life and economic
activity (Lerch & Nutzinger, 2002).
This constraint on carbon emissions is satisﬁed thanks to the introduction of
a market-based instrument in the form of a carbon price, which is considered by
economists as the most eﬃcient way to tackle the diversity of emissions of
greenhouses gases and abatement sources in the economy (Aldy & Stavins,
2012). The carbon price increases the cost of ﬁnal goods and intermediate con-
sumption as a function of the carbon content of the energy used, and favors the
adoption of carbon mitigation options in carbon-intensive sectors (industry,
residential, power generation, and transport). Since 2010, at speciﬁed dates the
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Figure 2. Carbon emission profile under climate policy.
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carbon price value is endogenously calculated to curve carbon emissions accord-
ing to the prescribed objective, and associated revenues are collected by
the government, which then reallocates them to households or ﬁrms through
transfers.
A climate policy applied uniformly to all regions and sectors and relying on a
world-level carbon price instrument is obviously a simpliﬁcation of what can be
reasonably expected in the future and is chosen for the sake of simplicity. It
poses in particular a number of questions that are far beyond the scope of this
article but are worth noting here: (a) monetary transfers to gain compliance of
emerging countries;10 (b) tax exemptions to protect certain speciﬁc activities (on
the pattern of the EU-ETS for industrial activities); and (c) the role of accom-
panying measures to climate policies such as ﬁscal reforms (Combet, Ghersi,
Hourcade, & The´ry, 2010), speciﬁc labor market policies (Guivarch, Crassous,
Sassi, & Hallegatte, 2011), or complementary infrastructure policies (Waisman,
Guivarch, & Lecocq, 2013).
Specifications for International Trade
All intermediate and ﬁnal goods are internationally tradable, and the total
demand for each good is satisﬁed by a mix of domestic production and imports.
Domestic and international markets for all goods are cleared (i.e., no stock is
allowed) by a unique set of endogenous relative prices (the terms of trade), which
adjust to maintain the equilibrium of the balance of payments deﬁned by the
sum of trade ﬂows and capital ﬂows.
Trade ﬂows are represented in physical quantities for energy ﬂows (MToe),
whereas all other goods are described with Armington (1969) speciﬁcations to
capture imperfect substitutability among goods produced in diﬀerent regions.
We consider two parametric options to capture alternative visions of trade
globalization:
. A high value of Armington elasticities representing high substitutability
between goods produced in diﬀerent places. This assumption favors a pursuit
of current trends of international trade with intense competition and import-
ant export/import ﬂows in all world regions (assumption M+).
. A low value of Armington elasticities representing low substitutability
between goods produced in diﬀerent places and a preference for local
goods. This assumption comes down to envisage a slowing down of inter-
national trade and a re-regionalization of production close to demand mar-
kets (assumption M).
The endogenization of capital ﬂows has hardly been integrated in global-scale
energy-economy models11 because of a lack of shared empirical evidence12 and
unresolved controversies in the economic literature.13 Following this diagnosis,
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we adopt exogenous assumptions on the dynamics of capital ﬂows, deﬁned by
the net balance between capital exports and imports, including the return to
foreign direct investments. Base year imbalances on capital ﬂows are explicitly
represented through the calibration of capital imports/exports at the initial date.
Their dynamics are ruled by two alternative assumptions:
. A constant-over-time share of exported capital to picture a pursuit of current
international capital imbalances (assumption K+).
. An exponential decrease of all capital ﬂows to represent a progressive cor-
rection of international capital imbalances by 2050. This assumption corres-
ponds to a vision of fragmented capital markets imposing ﬁnancing of local
investments with local capital (assumption K).
By combining the assumptions on trade and capital ﬂows, we deﬁne four scen-
arios representing four visions of the future of globalization processes (Table 2).
The scenario “Continued Globalization” can be viewed as a benchmark case in
the sense that it assumes a pursuit of current trends in both goods trade and
capital ﬂows. Other scenarios consider changes in the globalization process,
either through a fragmentation of capital markets (“Fragmented Capital”) or a
regionalization of trade ﬂows (“Regionalized Trade”). Finally, the scenario
“De-globalization” combines both breaks in the globalization process.
Long-Term Oil Profiles and Macroeconomic Trajectories
In this section, we start by considering the case where climate policy is not imple-
mented so that no constraint on carbon emissions is imposed. We investigate the
dynamics of oil markets and their macroeconomic eﬀects on the transition toward
low-oil development patterns as imposed by constraints on oil availability.
Dynamics of Oil Markets
In all scenarios, the world oil production follows an inverted U-shape reaching a
maximum around 2030 (the so-called Peak Oil) before a continuous decrease
Table 2. Scenario Definition.
Assumption on capital markets
K+ K
Assumption on goods markets M+ Continued Globalization Fragmented Capital
M Regionalized Trade De-globalization
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over the long term. Oil prices follow a slightly increasing plateau around $100
per barrel before a sudden increase at the moment of Peak Oil and a stabilization
above $300 per barrel controlled by the diﬀusion of alternative fuels.
These outcomes are illustrated for the “Continued Globalization” scenario
in Figure 3.
To analyze the eﬀect of globalization assumptions, we compare produc-
tion and price trajectories in the three other scenarios with the preceding
trends (Figure 4).
The trends for the “Regionalized Trade” scenario (black dotted line) prove
that less intense international trade favors a moderation of oil demand and
around 10% lower oil prices in the long term. Indeed, the increased preference
for local goods favors a reduction of international trade and hence triggers a
lower dependence on fuels for transportation activities. This is conﬁrmed by the
signiﬁcantly lower energy intensity of the gross domestic product (GDP) in the
long term (Figure 5). On the contrary, the trends for the “Fragmented Capital”
scenario (gray dotted line) show that the decrease of capital transfers causes a
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Figure 4. World oil production and oil price in the four globalization scenarios.
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Figure 3. World oil production and oil price in the “Continued Globalization” scenario.
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higher energy intensity of GDP. Indeed, less capital ﬂuidity slows down the pace
of technical change and triggers a higher dependence on oil, which results in (a) a
signiﬁcantly higher oil demand in the ﬁrst 20 years, (b) a strong increase in
oil prices after Peak Oil, and (c) 20% higher long-term oil prices. The
“De-Globalization” scenario combining both fragmentations represents a mix
of both eﬀects described previously.
Long-Term Impacts of Oil Markets on Economic Activity
We now investigate the consequences of the sustainability challenge posed by oil
availability on the stability of socioeconomic trajectories, as measured by trends
of GDP. The time proﬁle of global growth rates (ﬁrst row in Table 3) deﬁnes
four periods between 2010 and 2100: (a) a fast economic growth during the
short-term period (2010–2030) driven by moderate energy prices, (b) a deep
economic crisis consecutive to Peak Oil (2030–2040) during which a surge in
oil price halves growth rates, (c) a recovery phase (2040–2050) fostering a post-
crisis catch-up with a temporary acceleration of economic growth once the
economy has adapted to high oil prices, and (d) a long-term regime (2050–
2100) in which the economy follows a smooth path in absence of new shocks.
Europe follows qualitatively the same trends but with lower absolute values of
growth rates as a developed region14 (third row of Table 3).
To have a better understanding of the socioeconomic consequences behind
these aggregated ﬁgures, we compare the eﬀective growth rate of the economy
with its natural growth rate, given by population and labor production growth.
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Figure 5. Energy intensity of GDP in the four globalization scenarios.
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We use this indicator to assess the sustainability of growth patterns. An eﬀective
growth remaining closer or lower than its natural rate indicates that constraints
aﬀect the economy and prevent exploitation of the productivity potentials, caus-
ing unemployment and losses of purchase power . Indeed, it captures the impos-
sibility of absorbing the total labor force at constant wages due to particularly
large adaptation diﬃculties in sectors or regions below the average growth. At
the global level, it turns out that this situation happens on average over the
whole period with particularly signiﬁcant gaps in the post-Peak Oil period and
in the very long term. It means that the world economy then experiences long
periods of unsustainable trajectories characterized by socioeconomic tensions.
This analysis remains true for Europe where growth rates remain below (or close
to) their natural rate after 2030. In particular, the recovery phase is relatively
moderate as captured by the growth rate failing to exceed natural rates from
2040 to 2050. Indeed, the European economy is particularly vulnerable to oil
price variations as a major importer.
To test the eﬀect of globalization on these outcomes, we compare world and
European GDP levels in the three other scenarios with the ones obtained in the
benchmark case (Figure 6).
The eﬀect of fragmented capital markets (gray dotted lines) is of great import-
ance during the transition with 10% lower global GDP around 2030 (13% lower
in Europe). This is the result of the constraints this assumption imposes on
capital availability for investments in technical change. They aﬀect the resilience
of the economy to rising oil prices, especially in oil-importing economies such as
Europe. This eﬀect is persistent at a long-term horizon (6% and 8% decrease in
GDP in 2100 at the world and European levels, respectively) due to the cumu-
lative eﬀect on technical change. This is again the logical consequence of the
higher energy intensity of economic activity in a context of higher energy prices
(see previous section), which aﬀects households’ purchase power and ﬁrms’ pro-
duction costs.
The assumption on the regionalization of good markets has crucial eﬀects in
driving the reaction of the European economy to Peak Oil (black dotted lines).
Indeed, in this context of high energy prices, the value of European energy
importations signiﬁcantly increases, resulting in a parallel increase of industrial
exportations necessary to restore the equilibrium of the balance of payments.
Table 3. Growth Rates in the “Continued Globalization” Scenario.
2010–2100 2010–2030 2030–2040 2040–2050 2050–2100
World Effective growth rate (%) 2.41 3.87 1.94 2.88 1.83
Natural growth rate (%) 2.43 3.35 3.11 2.57 1.90
Europe Effective growth rate (%) 1.66 2.46 1.34 1.61 1.42
Natural growth rate (%) 1.63 2.05 1.89 1.65 1.41
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In the “Regionalized Trade” scenario, which assumes preference for local goods,
this can only occur through signiﬁcant gains of competitiveness as measured by
a decrease of the terms of trade (ratio of local to international goods). This
means large real wage adjustments causing economic losses as captured by
lower GDP levels after 2030. At a longer term horizon, the overall eﬀect of
goods fragmentation is, in contrast, positive (5% higher global GDP in 2100).
The economy relies less on international trade, as local production mostly meets
the demand. This indeed entails lower oil demand and prices, which drives down
energy dependency and production costs, and enhances households’ purchase
power. This long-term positive eﬀect is less signiﬁcant at the European level. It is
oﬀset by obstacles, in a mature industrial system, to the development of local
production capacities able to deal with local demand.
These outcomes demonstrate that the globalization processes are far from
being neutral for both transition and long-term growth trajectories. However,
changes in globalization patterns do not modify the orders of magnitude (e.g.,
the maximum gap in GDP levels,10%,corresponds to only 0.1% lower average
growth rate over the century). This proves that acting on globalization processes
is insuﬃcient to avoid important socioeconomic costs due to the sustainability
challenge raised by oil availability.
The Transition Toward a Low-Carbon Society
We now investigate the impact of implementing a climate policy in the form
discussed in the Climate Constraints and Carbon Price section, which aims to
stabilize temperature increase at +2.5 C with respect to preindustrial levels.
Carbon Pricing and Natural Resource Exploitation
We start by analyzing the consequences of the introduction of a constraint on
carbon emissions in the “Continued Globalization” scenario. The constraint on
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Figure 6. World and Europe GDP levels in the four globalization scenarios.
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carbon emissions is met through the introduction of a carbon price (Figure 7),
for which four distinct phases can be distinguished, consistent with the climate
policy analysis by Waisman, Guivarch, et al. (2012).
During the ﬁrst years (2010–2030), the carbon price progressively increases to
reach $120 per tCO2 around 2030, with hardly no eﬀect on oil prices, which
remain controlled by Middle East producers. This carbon price level is necessary
to tap most mitigation potentials in power, residential, and industrial sectors,
which represent the core of emissions reductions at that time point (IPCC, 2007).
Between 2030 and 2050, the carbon price stagnates and even slightly declines
without hampering emission reductions. Indeed, two mechanisms combine to
sustain the decarbonization process: (a) the cost decrease of carbon-free options
implied by the cumulative eﬀect of learning by doing and (b) the sudden rise of
oil prices following Peak Oil although moderated as the climate policy stimulates
fossil-free technical change. Between 2050 and 2070, to reach the high-cost miti-
gation potentials in the transportation sector, maintaining eﬀorts to reduce emis-
sions is necessary based on a steep increase in carbon prices up to $1,400 per
tCO2. Indeed, the weak sensitivity of transport activities to energy prices and the
low oil prices at this time point (around $70 per barrel) caused by the accumu-
lation of low-oil technical and structural changes fostered by the climate policy
require strong carbon prices. After 2070, carbon prices, albeit high, reach a
constant value around $1,500 per tCO2. This level is suﬃcient to maintain
total emissions below 10Gt CO2 as imposed by the long-term emission con-
straint in Figure 2.
The production patterns of oil, coal, and gas show that the implementation of
a climate policy signiﬁcantly moderates the exploitation of these fossil
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Figure 7. Carbon price in the “Continued Globalization” scenario.
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nonrenewable energies (Figure 8). Until 2030, the carbon price fosters meaning-
ful lower oil and coal production under climate policy with, in particular, a
plateau instead of a peak oil production proﬁle. Gas demand increases as
a substitute for oil and coal, given the competitiveness advantages of this low-
carbon energy. The situation is opposite between 2030 and 2050, when the stag-
nation of carbon prices favors the return of coal. Finally, after 2050, carbon
prices are so high that the use of the three carbon-intensive energies progres-
sively declines.
As a result of these trends, the share of 2001 reserves that would remain after
the 2001–2100 period highlights the eﬀect of a climate policy on the sustainabil-
ity of fossil resource exploitation (Table 4). The most prominent eﬀect impacts
oil, for which the climate policy avoids the critical depletion experienced in the
baseline scenario (18% of 2001 oil reserves remain in the soil in 2100 vs. only 6%
in absence of climate policy). For coal and gas, which are much more abundant
than oil, the climate policy also contributes to a signiﬁcant slowdown of
the exhaustion process. Note that these conclusions are robust to diﬀerent
assumptions on globalization trends.
Macroeconomic Effects of Climate Policies on Europe
Climate policies decrease the average growth rate from 1.66% to 1.51% in the
“Continued Globalization” scenario. This demonstrates that maintaining the
global temperature at an acceptable level comes at a moderate cost for Europe.
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In addition, because we do not assess the beneﬁts provided by avoiding damage
caused by climate change, it seems reasonable to consider that the overall eﬀect of
the climate policy is not negative in terms of sustainability.
Beyond this aggregate picture, climate policies have diﬀerent macroeconomic
eﬀects depending on the time marker considered (Table 5). At a short-term
period (2010–2030), they signiﬁcantly slow down economic growth (from
2.46% per year without climate policy to 2.08% per year). This is the result
of the introduction of the carbon price, which impacts the carbon-intensive
European economy. However, growth rates remain above their natural level.
At a medium-term time point (between 2030 and 2050), climate policies trigger a
much faster economic growth. This is a cobeneﬁt of low-carbon measures that
fosters a decreased oil dependency and moderates the eﬀects of Peak Oil.
Interestingly, economic growth remains above its natural rate during the
entire 2010–2050 period under climate policies (contrary to baseline cases exam-
ined previously where temporary crises are experienced after Peak Oil). This
underlines the role of climate policies in preparing a sustainable future by build-
ing a hedge against the uncertainty concerning oil supply (Rozenberg et al.,
2010). The picture changes when considering the long-term period, after 2050.
Indeed, Table 5 indicates that a climate policy may cause important losses as
captured by the low growth rates (1.3% per year and 1% per year). In particular,
these values remain below the natural rate during the last 50 years, picturing a
long-lasting socioeconomic crisis. This is in particular due to the necessity to
control transport-related emissions, which requires a fast increase in carbon
price given the weak eﬀect of price signals on this sector.
Macroeconomic Effects and Globalization
We ﬁnally turn to analyze the eﬀect of globalization assumptions on these results
by comparing economic growth trends in the four scenarios under climate
policy. Although the assumptions on globalization prove to hardly aﬀect the
average trends (as demonstrated by the very close values of average growth
Table 4. Fossil Energy Uses in the “Continued Globalization” Scenarios.
Reserves in 2001 (EJ)
Remaining reserves in 2100 (EJ) [share of 2001 reserves]
No climate constraint
Climate stabilization
at +2.5 C
Coal 83,652 46,631 [56%] 51,664 [62%]
Oil 16,850 1,060 [6%] 3,103 [18%]
Gas 24,241 9,795 [40%] 12,734 [52%]
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rates), the analysis of time proﬁles helps to identify the major eﬀects of global-
ization under climate constraint (Table 6).
In the short to medium term, fragmented capital markets essentially under-
mine growth until 2030 (2.02% vs. 2.08% over 2010–2030). Indeed, this period
requires a fast technical change to start the decarbonization of the economy.
Restrictions on the availability of capital slow down this process and are par-
ticularly hindering at this time marker. In particular, they impose signiﬁcantly
higher carbon prices in 2030 (around $150 per tCO2 in the “Fragmented
Capital” scenario vs. $120 per tCO2 in the “Continued Globalization”). At
the same time point, the dominant eﬀect of the assumption on trade regional-
ization occurs after 2030. As we have discussed in the absence of climate policy,
growth diﬀerentials between “Regionalized Trade” and “Continued
Globalization” scenarios happen when oil price are high after Peak Oil.
Under climate policy, the moderation of oil demand consecutive to the intro-
duction of carbon price delays this price increase by around 10 years. As a
consequence, the period during which growth rates are lower in the
“Regionalized Trade” scenario happens around 2040 with relatively lower aver-
age growth rates over 2030–2050 (1.72% vs. 1.78%).
In the long term, diﬀerent visions of globalization do not radically change the
conclusions of a long-lasting crisis with growth rates below their natural level.
Indeed, the assumptions about globalization do not modify the basic cause of
this outcome, that is, the necessity to control transport-related emissions.
Table 5. European GDP Growth Rates Under Climate Policy in the “Continued
Globalization” Scenario.
2010–2100 2010–2030 2030–2050 2050–2070 2070–2100
Growth rate climate stabilization
at +2.5 C (%)
1.51 2.08 1.78 1.33 1.05
Natural growth rate (%) 1.63 2.05 1.69 1.53 1.34
Table 6. European GDP Growth Rates Under Climate Policy in the Four Globalization
Scenarios.
2010–2100 2010–2030 2030–2050 2050–2070 2070–2100
De-globalization (%) 1.48 2.01 1.80 1.19 1.11
Fragmented Capital (%) 1.47 2.02 1.79 1.16 1.10
Regionalized Trade (%) 1.51 2.05 1.72 1.40 1.09
Continued Globalization (%) 1.51 2.08 1.78 1.33 1.05
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It is, however, worth noting the mechanisms at play between 2050 and 2070,
when the dominant eﬀect is due to the fast increase in carbon prices to control
transport-related emissions. Less intense international trade in the
“Regionalized Trade” scenario then proves beneﬁcial (1.40% vs. 1.33% in the
“Continued Globalization” scenario). The lower reliance on international trans-
port indeed reduces the overall dependency of the economy on transport. In
contrast, fragmented capital markets have strong negative impacts at this time
point (1.16% vs. 1.33% in the “Continued Globalization” scenario) because
they limit the pace at which the economy can adjust to the deep changes imposed
by fast-growing carbon prices.
Discussion, Policy Insights, and Concluding Remarks
This article has identiﬁed several salient features of macroeconomic adjustments
in Europe under the constraints imposed by the depletion of fossil fuel resources,
carbon emissions reduction targets, and diﬀerent visions of globalization.
Building on the main results of the article, this section provides principles to
frame the implementation of climate and energy policies at the European level
consistent with the challenges raised in the Green Paper “A 2030 Framework for
Climate and Energy Policies” (European Commission, 2013, p. 16).
Benefits and Risks of Global Price Signals
The modeling exercise considers market prices as major determinants of
changes, whether it be international energy or carbon price. These economy-
wide instruments provide a signal aﬀecting agents’ behaviors in diﬀerent com-
ponents of economic activities. The economic theory also advocates them as the
most eﬃcient way of addressing environmental constraints. The analysis of the
results demonstrates that these types of instruments can trigger deep changes
required under energy and climate constraint. The results presented in the Long-
Term Oil Proﬁles and Macroeconomic Trajectories section show that, even
under imperfect expectations about oil scarcity, average GDP growth rates
remain above their natural level. This means that oil price signals are suﬃcient
to support a transition toward sustainable low-oil patterns. The results reported
in The Transition Toward a Low-Carbon Society section also show that a global
carbon price entails carbon emissions reduction with respect to an ambitious
stabilization target at +2.5 C while allowing sustained economic development
throughout the century.
However, the analysis also reveals that market price instruments may induce
risk of large economic downturns when the environmental constraint (depletion
of fossil fuel resources and carbon constraint) forces drastic but unantici-
pated economic changes. Indeed, market prices may provide wrong incentives
likely to induce allocations of investments that may be ill adapted to future
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energy-economy conditions. This is notably the case in the Long-Term Oil
Proﬁles and Macroeconomic Trajectories section, where moderate oil prices
during the ﬁrst decades do not prepare the economy for oil disruptions that
occur during the Peak Oil period. This causes low medium-term growth rates
that remain well below their natural level, revealing large socioeconomic ten-
sions. This is also the case during the ﬁrst stages of the introduction of a carbon
price in The Transition Toward a Low-Carbon Society section, which induces
low growth rates to force the economy to adjust to this constraint. These results
show that price signals that translate to market adjustments may not be suitable
to provide correct information on future energy conditions. They may also result
in the wrong allocation of investments, hampering growth and welfare.
Combining both sides of the analysis, we can conclude that a global price
signal is a useful tool to frame the transition processes toward a sustainable
energy future. However, market mechanisms may not be the best way to set
such signals. This calls for introducing investment incentives that depart from
pure market price signals and include long-term views on fossil fuel resources
and climate through a politically agreed-upon value of the social cost of
carbon.16 The EU-ETS illustrates the limit of signals given by a carbon price.
It brings a uniform carbon price for large industrial and power-generating
plants, and the progressive decline of the cap oﬀers a guarantee that global
carbon emissions will decrease according to the predeﬁned objective.
However, the EU-ETS has failed so far to provide a correct price signal.
Indeed, the excess of allowances has resulted in a low and volatile carbon
price, which does not give investors suﬃcient incentives to develop low-carbon
projects. This hence generates risks of carbon lock-in.
Given these drawbacks of market price signals at the global level, comple-
mentary instruments must be considered both at the local (national or regional)
level through sectoral measures and at the global level through nonpricing
policies.
Complementary Local Policies
The rationale for local policies is to provide incentives to induce changes in
crucial sectors for energy and climate issues, especially those faced with behav-
ioral biases (e.g., imperfect foresights of future energy prices) and technical
inertias. The EU has already implemented a large set of such sectoral meas-
ures.17 The modeling exercise helps to identify two key challenges for their
design regarding long-term sustainability objectives.
On one hand, sectoral measures should not be a no regret option only but
should also anticipate energy futures and reduce the vulnerability of the econ-
omy to the short- and long-term changes of the global energy system. A key
result of the Long-Term Oil Proﬁles and Macroeconomic Trajectories section
highlights that short-term market prices give biased information of future
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energy-economy conditions and are therefore insuﬃcient to accelerate a tech-
nical change toward low-oil dependency of the economy in due time. Given the
inertias in the buildings and transport sectors, sectoral measures should not be
postponed until the emergence of a clear price signal, but rather should antici-
pate the changes of economic conditions to foster the diﬀusion of energy eﬃ-
ciency in due time.
On the other hand, sectoral measures should not be limited to energy eﬃ-
ciency but also include infrastructure policies aﬀecting the structure of socio-
economic interactions and its exposure to energy and climate constraints. This is
particularly true for transport, which is a high-energy and carbon-intensive
sector characterized by weak price sensitivity. Speciﬁc measures are therefore
necessary to control mobility. In The Transition Toward a Low-Carbon Society
section, a steep rise of carbon prices is required to curb transport-related emis-
sions. It causes a drastic slowdown of economic growth under climate policy
after 2050. The core of these costs can be avoided provided that the deployment
of infrastructures favoring sustainable cities and low-transport production sys-
tems starts in the early phase of the policy (Waisman et al., 2013). Green logistics
and sustainable supply chain management to move toward sustainable transport
(international shipping and long-haul aviation) also provide potential answers to
this issue (Ko¨hler et al., 2014). In general, these results echo the current debates
on the lack of ambitious programs of infrastructures at the European level.
To go further into the assessment of these policies, the model could be
improved to represent infrastructure networks and behaviors associated with
the building and transport sectors. The objective would be to capture explicitly
the role of crucial sectoral measures for energy and climate issues. This means in
particular incorporating an explicit representation of mechanisms related to
urban dynamics and production structure, including the logistics organization.
Complementary Global Policies
We considered in this article nonpricing global measures that can be put in place
to tackle the issues raised by globalization as a crucial dimension of sustainable
pathways. Sensitivity tests on the four scenarios of globalization in the Long-
Term Oil Proﬁles and Macroeconomic Trajectories and The Transition Toward
a Low-Carbon Society sections help to identify basic mechanisms that link glo-
balization and macroeconomic trajectories under energy and climate constraints.
Moving toward more regionalized trade where local ﬁrms are less exposed to
international competition has two major eﬀects. On one hand, in a context of
high energy imports consecutive to fossil fuel price increases caused by scarcity
eﬀects, obstacles to trade may undermine the balance of payments. Less eﬃcient
competitiveness gains would not induce exportation increases able to compen-
sate energy-related ﬂows. On the other hand, the reduction of trade volumes
goes with a decoupling between consumption patterns and transport, which has
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the advantage of reducing transport-related energy and carbon uses. Regarding
capital ﬂows, fragmented markets limit the access to capital and delay technical
change. This aﬀects the resilience of the economy to rising oil prices, especially in
oil-importing economies such as Europe. This eﬀect is persistent in the long term
because of the cumulative eﬀects on technical change.
To go further into this analysis of globalization patterns under energy con-
straints, the model could be improved by representing explicitly all determinants
of capital allocation to analyze the conditions of an allocation of investments in
accordance with energy-sustainability objectives. Hourcade and Shukla (2013),
building on Hourcade, Perrissin, and Rozenberg (2012), show the crucial role of
organizing a low-carbon ﬁnance able to generate a suﬃcient amount of capital
and to direct capital funds toward the funding of low-carbon infrastructures.
The redirection of investment still needs speciﬁc devices. For example, a social
cost of carbon as part of a climate-friendly architecture may enhance investors’
conﬁdence in low-carbon projects and reduce the attractiveness of speculative
investments.
Toward a Policy Mix to Tackle Long-Term Energy Sustainability Issues
The above analysis identiﬁes challenges that require a policy mix that resorts to a
plurality of complementary instruments. For this purpose, two main character-
istics should be taken into account.
First, the mix of policy instruments to tackle the twofold challenges posed by
resource scarcity and climate change must be designed to beneﬁt from potential
synergies between both objectives. In particular, the analysis of the medium-term
eﬀect of a climate policy in The Transition Toward a Low-Carbon Society section
has showed the potentials for cobeneﬁts of carbon control measures. They can act
as a hedging strategy against the scarcity of oil reserves. Thus, policy instruments
based on the synergies between diﬀerent objectives to combine the beneﬁts of each
of the instruments must be favored. This is in line with the statement of the G&P
that “the 2030 framework must identify how best to maximize synergies and deal
with trade-oﬀs between the objectives of competitiveness, security of energy
supply and sustainability” (European Commission, 2013).
Second, the articulation and the time sequencing of policy instruments must
be a key concern when designing the policy mix to ensure a sustained action
throughout the century. For example, any pricing scheme must be conceived
according to its compatibility with the EU-ETS, which already proposes some
forms of pricing for energy-intensive industrial sectors. In addition, price instru-
ments have an immediate eﬀect, whereas policies targeting long-lived infrastruc-
ture involve a gap between their implementation and their ultimate eﬀects. This
is why, in particular, early investments on transport infrastructure to support
climate action are required to ensure that they generate beneﬁts in the middle of
the century when they become crucial to controlling transport-related emissions.
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Notes
1. The European Union (EU) has published a series of official documents putting for-
ward the articulation between climate change policies, energy policies, and competi-
tiveness. In addition to the 20-20-20 policy objectives adopted in 2008 (20% emissions
reductions, 20% renewables in the total energy consumption of Europe, 20% energy
savings by 2020), the “Europe 2020” strategy adopted in 2010 (European Commission,
2010) sets five ambitious objectives—employment, innovation, education, social inclu-
sion, and climate/energy—to be reached by 2020. “The Roadmap for Moving to a
Competitive Low Carbon Economy in 2050” (European Commission, 2011) adopted
by the Commission proposes to extend these objectives to 2050, while the recent G&P
(European Commission, 2013) “A 2030 Framework for Climate and Energy Policies”
proposes objectives to 2030.
2. Indeed, given that imports supply 40% of European primary energy, corresponding to
2.8% of the EU GDP, energy security is a policy priority for the EU and its member
states as put forward in recent official texts (see, e.g., the 2013 G&P).
3. Technical change is a change in the amount of output produced from the same inputs.
Such a change is not necessarily technological but might include organizational trans-
formations or be the result of a change in a constraint such as regulation, prices, or
quantities of inputs.
4. At stabilization levels around 400 ppm CO2eq or below, global mean tempera-
tures are likely to stay below 2 C, and there is a 50% probability of exceeding a
2 C temperature increase at levels of around 450 ppm CO2eq. (IPCC AR4 WGI 2.12).
5. “The Conference of the Parties . . . realizes that addressing climate change requires a
paradigm shift towards building a low-carbon society that offers substantial opportu-
nities and ensures continued high growth and sustainable development, based on innova-
tive technologies andmore sustainable production and consumption and lifestyles, while
ensuring a just transition of the workforce that creates decent work and quality jobs.”
Advance unedited version, Draft decision -/CP.16—Outcome of the work of theAdHoc
Working Group on Long-Term Cooperative Action under the Convention, Article 10
http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2010/cop16/eng/07a01.pdf
6. This is illustrated by the Gleneagles Communique´ following the G8 summit in 2005,
which explicitly links energy security and climate change: “(a) Climate change is a
serious and long-term challenge . . . We know that increased need and use of energy
from fossil fuels contribute in large part to increases in greenhouse gases associated
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with the warming of our Earth’s surface; (b) Global energy demands are expected to
grow by 25% over the next 25 years. This has the potential to cause a significant
increase in greenhouse gas emissions associated with climate change . . .; (c) Secure,
reliable and affordable energy sources are fundamental to economic stability and
development. Rising energy demand poses a challenge to energy security given
increased reliance on global energy markets . . . ”
7. The version of the IMACLIM-R model used in this study divides the world in 12
regions (the United States, Canada, Europe, Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development [OECD] Pacific, former Soviet Union, China, India,
Brazil, Middle East, Africa, rest of Asia, and rest of Latin America) and 12 sectors
(coal, oil, gas, liquid fuels, electricity, air transport, water transport, other transport,
construction, agriculture, energy-intensive industry, and services and light industry).
8. Those coefficients count only the emissions actually released in the atmosphere, with
the exception of those captured either biologically (biofuels) or technologically
(carbon capture and sequestration).
9. The adoption of an ambitious global agreement on climate reduction emissions by
2015 and strong assumptions on technical change are indeed necessary to comply
with the 2 C objective, which leaves little flexibility in terms of action (Edenhofer
et al., 2010; Guivarch & Hallegatte, 2013).
10. See, for example, Luderer et al. (2012) for an analysis of different cap-and-trade
schemes and their consequences on climate policy costs.
11. A notable exception is McKibbin, Ross, Shackleton, and Wilcoxen (1999).
12. For example, in a historical study of capital flows over the long term (1865–1992),
Hogendorn (1998) demonstrates that no simple rule emerges for capital flow dynam-
ics, given the fluctuations of capital mobility over time in parallel with different
phases of international monetary and financial governance: high capital mobility
during the gold standard period (1880–1913), almost closed economies during the
interwar and Bretton Woods periods (1914–1969), and increasing mobility in the
modern period (1970–1992).
13. The issue of capital mobility has given rise to a large controversy since the econo-
metric study by Feldstein and Horioka (1980), who demonstrated low capital mobil-
ity from 1960 to 1974, in contradiction with widely shared ideas. This “puzzle” was
the starting point of a large body of literature trying to identify the major drivers of
capital flows, but which has failed to reach consensual answers (see Apergis &
Tsoumas, 2009, for a survey).
14. In the model, the natural growth is driven by labor productivity assumptions. We
assume that the United States remains the world leader in productivity per worker
with a steady growth of 1.7% per year, whereas the dynamics of productivity in other
countries is driven by a partial catch-up. This means that regions with lower absolute
productivity per worker in a country experience the faster labor productivity growth.
Europe is close to the United States in terms of productivity and experiences low
labor productivity growth (Waisman, Guivarch, et al., 2012).
15. See, for example, Quinet et al. (2008).
16. For example, in the directives on the EcoDesign of Households’ Equipment (2009/
125/EC), the Energy Labelling of Households’ Equipment (2010/30/EU), the
Renewable Energy Sources (RES; 2009/28/EC), the Energy Performance of
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Buildings (2002/91/EC), and the Energy Efficiency (2012/27/EU), as well as through
the Regulations on Performance Standards for Light Duty Vehicles in Transport
(510/2011).
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